Levesque introduced the notion of only-knowing to precisely capture the beliefs of a knowledge base. He also showed how only-knowing can be used to formalize non-monotonic behavior within a monotonic logic. Despite its appeal, all attempts to extend only-knowing to the many agent case have undesirable properties. A belief model by Halpern and Lakemeyer, for instance, appeals to proof-theoretic constructs in the semantics and needs to axiomatize validity as part of the logic. It is also not clear how to generalize their ideas to a first-order case. In this paper, we propose a new account of multi-agent only-knowing which, for the first time, has a natural possible-world semantics for a quantified language with equality. We then provide, for the propositional fragment, a sound and complete axiomatization that faithfully lifts Levesque's proof theory to the many agent case. We also discuss comparisons to the earlier approach by Halpern and Lakemeyer.
Introduction
Levesque's notion of only-knowing is a single agent monotonic logic that was proposed with the intention of capturing certain types of nonmonotonic reasoning. Levesque ([1990] ) already showed that there is a close connection to Moore's ([1985] ) autoepistemic logic (AEL). Recently, Lakemeyer and Levesque ([2005] ) showed that only-knowing can be adapted to capture default logic as well. The main benefit of using Levesque's logic is that, via simple semantic arguments, nonmonotonic conclusions can be reached without the use of meta-logical notions such as fixpoints [Rosati 2000 ; Levesque & Lakemeyer 2001 ] . Only-knowing is then naturally of interest in a many agent context, since agents capable of non-trivial nonmonotonic behavior should believe other agents to also be equipped with nonmonotonic mechanisms. For instance, if all that Bob knows is that Tweety is a bird and a default that birds typically fly, then Alice, if she knows all that Bob knows, concludes that Bob believes Tweety can fly. 1 Also, the idea of only-knowing a collection of sentences is useful for modeling the beliefs of a knowledge base (KB), since sentences that are not logically entailed by the KB are taken to be precisely those not believed. If many agents are involved, and suppose Alice has some beliefs on Bob's KB, then she could capitalize on Bob's knowledge to collaborate on tasks, or plan a strategy against him.
As a logic, Levesque's construction is unique in the sense that in addition to a classical epistemic operator for belief, he introduces a modality to denote what is at most known. This new modality has a subtle relationship to the belief operator that makes extensions to a many agent case non-trivial. Most extensions so far make use of arbitrary Kripke structures, that already unwittingly discard the simplicity of Levesque's semantics. They also have some undesirable properties, perhaps invoking some caution in their usage. For instance, in a canonical model (Lakemeyer 1993) , certain types of epistemic states cannot be constructed. In another Kripke approach (Halpern 1993) , the modalities do not seem to interact in an intuitive manner. Although an approach by Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001] ) does indeed successfully model multi-agent only-knowing, it forces us to have the semantic notion of validity directly in the language and has proof-theoretic constructs in the semantics via maximally consistent sets. Precisely for this reason, that proposal is not natural, and it is matched with a proof theory that has a set of new axioms to deal with these new notions. It is also not clear how one can extend their semantics to the first-order case. Lastly, an approach by Waaler ([2004] ) avoids such an axiomatization of validity, but the model theory also has problems [Waaler & Solhaug 2005] . Technical discussions on their semantics are deferred to later.
The goal of this paper is to show that there is indeed a natural semantics for multi-agent onlyknowing for the quantified language with equality. For the propositional subset, there is also a sound and complete axiomatization that faithfully generalizes Levesque's proof theory. 2 We also differ from Halpern and Lakemeyer in that we do not enrich the language any more than necessary (modal operators for each agent), and we do not make use of canonical Kripke models. And while canonical models, in general, are only workable semantically and can not be used in practice, our proposal has a computational appeal to it. We also show that if we do enrich the language with a modal operator for validity, but only to establish a common language with [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001 ], then we agree on the set of valid sentences. Finally, we obtain a first-order multi-agent generalization of AEL, defined solely using notions of classical logical entailment and theoremhood.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review Levesque's notions, 3 and define a semantics with so-called k-structures. We then compare the framework to earlier attempts. Following that, we introduce a sound and complete axiomatization for the propositional fragment. In the last sections, we sketch the multi-agent (first-order) generalization of AEL, and prove that k-structures and [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001 ] agree on valid sentences, for an enriched language. Then, we conclude and end.
The k-structures Approach
The non-modal part of Levesque's logic 4 ON L consists of standard first-order logic with = and a countably infinite set of standard names N . 5 To keep matters simple, function symbols are not considered in this language. We call a predicate other than =, applied to first-order variables or standard names, an atomic formula. We write α x n to mean that the variable x is substituted in α by a standard name. If all the variables in a formula α are substituted by standard names, then we call it a ground formula. Here, a world is simply a set of ground atoms, and the semantics is defined over the set of all possible worlds W. The standard names are thus rigid designators, and denote precisely the same entities in all worlds. ON L also has two modal operators: L and N . While Lα is to be read as "at least α is known", N α is to be read as "at most ¬α is known". A set of possible worlds is referred to as the agent's epistemic state e. Defining a model to be the pair (e, w) for w ∈ W, components of ON L's meaning of truth are:
1. e, w |= p iff p ∈ w and p is a ground atom, 2. e, w |= (m = n) iff m and n are identical standard names, 3. e, w |= ¬α iff e, w |= α, 4. e, w |= α ∨ β iff e, w |= α or e, w |= β, 5. e, w |= ∀x. α iff e, w |= α x n for all standard names n,
6. e, w |= Lα iff for all w ′ ∈ e, e, w ′ |= α, and 7. e, w |= N α iff for all w ′ ∈ e, e, w ′ |= α.
The main idea is that α is (at least) believed iff it is true at all worlds considered possible, while (at most) α is believed to be false iff it is true at all worlds considered impossible. So, an agent is said to only-know α, syntactically expressed as Lα ∧ N ¬α, when worlds in e are precisely those where α is true. Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001] ) underline three features of the semantical framework of ON L, the intuitions of which we desire to maintain in the many agent setting:
1. Evaluating N α does not affect the epistemic possibilities. Formally, in ON L, after evaluating formulas of the form N α the agent's epistemic state is still given by e.
2. A union of the agent's possibilities, that evaluate L, and the impossible worlds that evaluate N , is fixed and independent of e, and is the set of all conceivable states. Formally, in ON L, Lα is evaluated wrt. worlds w ∈ e, and N α is evaluated wrt. worlds w ∈ W − e; the union of which is W. The intuition is that the exact complement of an agent's possibilities is used in evaluating N .
3. Given any set of possibilities, there is always a model where precisely this set is the epistemic state. Formally, in ON L, any subset of W can be defined as the epistemic state.
Although these notions seem clear enough in the single agent case, generalizing them to the many agent case is non-trivial [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] . We shall return to analyze the features shortly. Let us begin by extending the language. Let ON L n be a first-order modal language that enriches the nonmodal subset of ON L with modal operators L i and N i for i = a, b. For ease of exposition, we only have two agents a (Alice) and b (Bob). Extensions to more agents is straightforward. We freely use O i , such that O i α is an abbreviation for L i α ∧ N i ¬α, and is read as "all that i knows is α". Objective and subjective formulas are understood as follows.
Definition 2.1:
The i-depth of a formula α, denoted |α| i , is defined inductively as ( i denotes L i or N i ):
1. |α| i = 1 for atoms,
A formula has a depth k if max(a-depth,b-depth) = k. A formula is called i-objective if all epistemic operators which do not occur within the scope of another epistemic operator are of the form j for i = j. A formula is called i-subjective if every atom is in the scope of an epistemic operator and all epistemic operators which do not occur within the scope of another epistemic operator are of the form
q has a depth of 4, a a-depth of 3 and a b-depth of 4. L b q is both b-subjective and a-objective. A formula is called objective if it does not mention any modal operators. A formula is called basic if it does not mention any N i for i = a, b. We now define a notion of epistemic states using k-structures. The main intuition is that we keep separate the worlds Alice believes from the worlds she considers Bob to believe, to depth k. Definition 2.2: A k-structure (k ≥ 1), say e k , for an agent is defined inductively as:
, where E m is the set of all m-structures.
A e 1 for Alice, denoted as e 1 a , is intended to represent a set of worlds { w, {} , . . .}. A e 2 is of the form { w, e 1 b , w ′ , e ′ 1 b , . . .}, and it is to be read as "at w, she believes Bob considers worlds from e 1 b possible but at w ′ , she believes Bob to consider worlds from e ′ 1 b possible". This conveys the idea that Alice has only partial information about Bob, and so at different worlds, her beliefs about what Bob knows differ. We define a e k for Alice, a e j for Bob and a world w ∈ W as a (k, j)-model (e k a , e j b , w). Only sentences of a maximal a-depth of k, and a maximal b-depth of j are interpreted wrt. a (k, j)-model. The complete semantic definition is:
1. e k a , e j b , w |= p iff p ∈ w and p is a ground atom,
2. e k a , e j b , w |= (m = n) iff m, n ∈ N and are identical,
And since O a α syntactically denotes L a α ∧ N a ¬α, it follows from the semantics that 8. e k a , e j b , w |= O a α iff for all worlds w ′ , for all e k−1 for Bob, w ′ , e
The semantics for L b α and N b α are given analogously.) A formula α (of a-depth of k and of b-depth of j) is satisfiable iff there is a (k, j)-model such that e k a , e j b , w |= α. The formula is valid (|= α) iff α is true at all (k, j)-models. Satisfiability is extended to a set of formulas Σ (of maximal a, b-depth of k, j) in the manner that there is a (k, j)-model e k a , e j b , w such that e k a , e j b , w |= α ′ for every α ′ ∈ Σ. We write Σ |= α to mean that for every
Validity is not affected if models of a depth greater than that needed are used. This is to say, if α is true wrt. all (k, j)-models, then α is true wrt. all (k ′ , j ′ )-models for k ′ ≥ k, j ′ ≥ j. We obtain this result by constructing for every e k ′ a , a k-structure e a ↓ k ′ k , such that they agree on all formulas of maximal a-depth k. Analogously for e
Lemma 2.4: For all formulas
Proof: By induction on the depth of formulas. The proof immediately holds for atomic formulas, disjunctions and negations since we have the same world w. Assume that the result holds for formulas of a, b-depth 1. Let α such a formula, and suppose e k ′ a , e
Lastly, since L a α is a-subjective, b's structure is irrelevant, and thus,
The cases for L b α, N a α and N b α are completely symmetric.
Theorem 2.5: For all formulas
Knowledge with k-structures satisfy weak S5 properties, and the Barcan formula [Hughes & Cresswell 1972] .
Lemma 2.6: If α is a formula, the following are valid wrt. models of appropriate depth ( i denotes L i or N i ):
Proof:
The proofs are similar. For item 3, wlog let i be L a . Suppose e k a , e j b , w |= ¬L a α. There is some w ′ , e
The case of N a is analogous.
Before moving on, let us briefly reflect on the fact that k-structures have finite depth. So suppose a only-knows KB, of depth k. Using k-structures allows us to reason about what is believed, up to depth k. Also, if we construct epistemic states from k ′ -structures where k ′ ≥ k, then the logic correctly captures non-beliefs beyond the depth k. To illustrate, let true (depth 1) be all that a knows. Then, it can easily be shown that both the sentences O a (true) ⊃ ¬L a ¬L b α and O a (true) ⊃ ¬L a L b α are valid sentences in the logic, by considering any e 2 (and higher) for a. For most purposes, this restriction of having a parameter k seems harmless in the sense that agents usually have a finite knowledge base with sentences of some maximal depth k and they should not be able to conclude anything about what is known at depths higher than k, with one exception. If we were to include a notion of common knowledge [Fagin, Halpern, Moses & Vardi 1995] , then we would get entailments about what is believed at arbitrary depths. With our current model, this cannot be captured, but we are willing to pay that price because in return we get, for the first time, a very simple possible-world style account of only-knowing. Similarly, we have nothing to say about (infinite) knowledge bases with unbounded depth.
Multi-Agent Only-Knowing
In this section, we return to the features of only-knowing discussed earlier and verify that the new semantics reasonably extends them to the multi-agent case. We also briefly discuss earlier attempts at capturing these features. Halpern ([1993] ), Lakemeyer ([1993] ), and Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001] ) independently attempted to extend ON L to the many agent case. 6 There are some subtle differences in their approaches, but the main restriction is they only allow a propositional language. Henceforth, to make the comparison feasible, we shall also speak of the propositional subset of ON L n with the understanding that the semantical framework is now defined for propositions (from an infinite set Φ) rather than ground atoms.
The main component in these features is the notion of possibility. In the single agent case, each world represents a possibility. Thus, from a logical viewpoint, a possibility is simply the set of objective formulas true at some world. Further, the set of epistemic possibilities is given by {{objective formulas true at w} | w ∈ e}. Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001] ) correctly argue that the appropriate generalization of the notion of possibility in the many agent case are i-objective formulas. Intuitively, a possible state of affairs according to a include the state of the world (objective formulas), as well as what b is taken to believe. The earlier attempts by Halpern and Lakemeyer use Kripke structures with accessibility relations K i for each agent i. Given a Kripke structure M , the notion of possibility is defined as the set of i-objective formulas true at some Kripke world, and the set of epistemic possibilities is obtained from the i-objective formulas true at all i-accessible worlds. Formally, the set of epistemic possibilities true at (M, w), where w is a world in M , is defined as {obj
is a set consisting of i-objective formulas true at (M, w ′ ). 7 Although intuitive, note that, even for the propositional subset of ON L, a Kripke world is a completely different entity from what Levesque supposes. Perhaps, one consequence is that the semantic proofs in earlier approaches are very involved. In contrast, we define worlds exactly as Levesque supposes. And, our notion of possibility is obtained from the set of a-objective formulas true at each w, e
Definition 3.1:
All the a-objective formulas true at a model M , essentially the objective formulas true wrt. w and the b-subjective formulas true wrt. e j b , are given by obj + a (M ). Note that these formulas do not strictly correspond to a's possibilities. Rather, we define Obj + a on her epistemic state e k a , and this gives us all the a-objectives formulas that a considers possible. We shall now argue that the intuition of all of Levesque's properties is maintained. 8 Property 1. In the single agent case, this property ensured that an agent's epistemic possibilities are not affected on evaluating N . This is immediately the case here. Given a model, say (e k a , e j b , w), a's epistemic possibilities are determined by Obj + a (e k a ). To evaluate N a α, we consider all models (e k a , e
Again, a's possibilities are given by Obj + a (e k a ) for all these models, and does not change.
Property 2. In the single agent case, this property ensured that evaluating Lα and N α is always wrt. the set of all possibilities, and completely independent of e. As discussed, in the many agent case, possibilities mean i-objective formulas and analogously, if α is a possibility in a's view, say an a-objective formula of maximal b-depth of k, then we should interpret L a α and N a α wrt. all aobjective possibilities of max. depth k: the set of (k + 1)-structures. Clearly then, the result is fixed and independent of the corresponding e k+1 . The following lemma is a direct consequence of the definition of the semantics.
Lemma 3.2:
Let α be a i-objective formula of j-depth k, for j = i. Then, the set of k +1-structures that evaluate L i α and N i α is E k+1 .
Property 3. The third property ensures that one can characterize epistemic states from any set of iobjective formulas. Intuitively, given such a set, we must have a model where precisely this set is the epistemic state. Earlier attempts at clarifying this property involved constructing a set of maximally K45 n -consistent sets of basic i-objective formulas, and showing that there exist an epistemic state that precisely corresponds to this set. But, defining possibilities via K45 n proof-theoretic machinery inevitably leads to some limitations, as we shall see. We instead proceed semantically, and go beyond basic formulas. Let Ω be a satisfiable set of i-objective formulas, say of maximal j-depth k, for j = i.
Let Ω ′ be a set obtained by adding a i-objective formula γ of maximal j-depth k such that Ω ′ is also satisfiable. By considering all i-objective formulas of maximal j-depth k, let us construct Ω ′ , Ω ′′ , . . . by adding formulas iff the resultant set remains satisfiable. When we are done, the resulting Ω * is what we shall call a maximally satisfiable i-objective set. 9 Naturally, there may be many such sets corresponding to Ω. We show that given a set of maximally satisfiable i-objective sets, there is a model where precisely this set characterizes the epistemic state. 
Proof: Consider S a . Each S ′ ∈ S a is a maximally satisfiable a-objective set, and thus by definition, there is a k-structure w ′ , e
}, corresponding to each S ′ ∈ S a , and let this be e * k a . It is immediate to verify that Obj + a (e * k a ) = S a . Analogously, for e * j b using S b . Finally, there is clearly some world w * where σ holds.
On Validity
How does the semantics compare to earlier approaches? In particular, we are interested in valid formulas. Lakemeyer ([1993] ) proposes a semantics using K45 n -canonical models, but he shows that the formula ¬O a ¬O b p for any proposition p is valid. Intuitively, it says that all that Alice knows is that Bob does not only know p, and as Lakemeyer argues, the validity of ¬O a ¬O b p is unintuitive. After all, Bob could honestly tell Alice that he does not only know p. The negation of this formula, on the other hand, is satisfiable in a Kripke structure approach by Halpern ([1993] ), called the i-set approach. 10 It is also satisfiable in the k-structure semantics. Interestingly, the i-set approach and k-structures agree on one more notion. The formula L a ⊥ ⊃ ¬N a ¬O b ¬O a p (ζ) is valid in both, while ¬ζ is satisfiable wrt. Lakemeyer ([1993] ). (It turns out that the validity of ζ in our semantical framework is implicitly related to the satisfiability of O b ¬O a p, so this property is not unreasonable.)
However, we immediately remark that the i-set approach and k-structures do not share too many similarities beyond those presented above. In fact, the i-set approach does not truly satisfy Levesque's second property. For instance, Halpern ([1993] ). Recall that, in this property, the union of models that evaluate N i α and L i α must lead to all conceivable states. So, the satisfiability of λ leaves open the question as to why O b p is not considered since ¬O b p is true at all conceivable states. We show that, in contrast, λ is not satisfiable in the k-structures approach. Lastly, [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] involves enriching the language, the intuitions of which are perhaps best explained after reviewing the proof theory, and so we defer discussions to later. 11 Theorem 3.4: The following are properties of the semantics: Thus, k-structures seem to satisfy our intuitions on the behavior of only-knowing. To understand why, notice that ¬O a ¬O b p and λ involve the nesting of N i operators. Lakemeyer ([1993] ) makes an unavoidable technical commitment. A (i-objective) possibility is formally a maximally K45 n -consistent set of basic i-objective formulas. The restriction to basic formulas is an artifact of a semantics based on the canonical model. Unfortunately, there is more to agent i's possibility than just basic formulas. In the case of Halpern ([1993] ), the problem seems to be that N i and L i do not interact naturally, and that the full complement of epistemic possibilities is not considered in interpreting N i . In contrast, Theorem 3.3 shows that we allow non-basic formulas and by using a strictly semantic notion, we avoid problems that arise from the proof-theoretic restrictions. And, since the semantics faithfully complies with the second property, λ is not satisfiable.
The natural question is if there are axioms that characterize the semantics. We begin, in the next section, with a proof theory by Lakemeyer ([1993] ) that is known to be sound and complete for all attempts so far, but for a restricted language.
Proof Theory
In the single agent case, ON L's proof theory consists of axioms of propositional logic, axioms that treat L and N as a classical belief operator in K45, an axiom that allows us to use N and L freely on subjective formulas, modus ponens (MP) and necessitation (NEC) for both L and N as inference rules, and the following axiom: 12 A5. N α ⊃ ¬Lα if ¬α is a propositionally consistent objective formula.
As we shall see, only the axiom A5 is controversial, since extending any objective α to any i-objective α is problematic. Mainly, the soundness of the axiom in the single agent case relies on propositional logic. But in the multi-agent case, since we go beyond propositional formulas establishing this consistency is non-trivial, and even circular. To this end, Lakemeyer ([1993] ) proposes to resolve this consistency by relying on the existing logic K45 n . As a consequence, his proof theoretic formulation appropriately generalizes all of Levesque's axioms, except for A5 where its application is restricted to only basic i-objective consistent formulas. We use ⊢ to denote provability.
Definition 4.1: ON L
− n consists of all formulas α in ON L n such that no N j may occur in the scope of a L i or a N i , for i = j.
The following axioms, along with MP and NEC (for L i and N i ) is an axiomatization that we refer to as AX n . AX n is sound and complete for the canonical model and the i-set approach for formulas in ON L − n .
12 Strictly speaking, this is not the proof theory introduced in [Levesque 1990 ], where an axiom replaces the inference rule NEC. Here, we consider an equivalent formulation by Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001] ). A1 n . All instances of propositional logic,
Observe that, as discussed, the soundness of A5 n is built on K45 n -consistency. Since our semantics is not based on Kripke structures, proving that every K45 n -consistent formula is satisfiable in some (k, j)-model is not immediate. We propose a construction called the (k, j)-correspondence model. In the following, in order to disambiguate W from Kripke worlds, we shall refer to our worlds as propositional valuations.
Definition 4.2:
The K45 n canonical model M c = W c , π c , K c a , K c b is defined as follows:
1. W c = {w | w is a (basic) maximally consistent set } 2. for all p ∈ Φ and worlds w, π c (w)(p) = true iff p ∈ w 
Further, e w j b is constructed analogously. Let us refer to this model as the (k, j)-correspondence model of (M c , w).
Roughly, Defn. 4.4 is a construction of a (k, j)-model that appeals to the accessibility relations in the canonical model. 13 Thus, a e 1 a for Alice wrt. w has precisely the valuations of Kripke worlds w ′ ∈ K c a (w). Quite analogously, a e k a is a set { w ′ , e k−1 }, where w ′ ∈ K c a (w) as before, but e k−1 is an epistemic state for Bob and hence refers all worlds w ′′ ∈ K c b (w ′ ). By a induction on the depth of a basic formula α, we obtain a theorem that α of maximal a, b-depth k, j is satisfiable at (M c , w) iff the (k, j)-correspondence model satisfies the formula. 
Lemma 4.6: Every K45 n -consistent basic formula α is satisfiable wrt. some (k, j)-model.
Proof:
It is a property of the canonical model that every K45 n -consistent basic formula is satisfiable wrt. the canonical model. Supposing that the formula has a a, b-depth of k, j then from Thm 4.5, we know there is at least the correspondence (k, j)-model that also satisfies the formula.
Theorem 4.7:
For all α ∈ ON L − n , if AX n ⊢ α then |= α.
Proof:
The soundness is easily shown to hold for A1 n − A4 n . The soundness of A5 n is shown by induction on the depth. Suppose α is a propositional formula, and say ¬α is a consistent propositional formula (and hence K45 n -consistent). Then there is a world w * such that {}, {}, w * |= ¬α. Given a e k a , if w * , e k−1 b ∈ e k a for some e k−1 b
, then e k a , {}, w |= ¬L a α for any world w. If not, then e k a , {}, w |= ¬N a α. Thus, e k a , {}, w |= N a α ⊃ ¬L a α. Wlog, assume the proof holds for a-objective formulas of max. b-depth k −1. Suppose now, α is such a formula, and ¬α is K45 n -consistent. By Lemma 4.6, there is w * , e * k−1 b , such that {}, e * k−1 b , w * |= ¬α. Again, if w * , e * k−1 b ∈ e k a , then e k a , {}, w |= ¬L a α and if not, then e k a , {}, w |= ¬N a α.
We proceed with the completeness over the following definition, and lemmas.
Definition 4.8:
A formula ψ is said to be independent of the formula φ wrt. an axiom system AX, if neither AX ⊢ φ ⊃ ψ nor AX ⊢ φ ⊃ ¬ψ.
Lemma 4.9: [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001 ] If φ 1 , . . . , φ m are K45 n -consistent basic i-objective formulas then there exists a basic i-objective formula ψ of the form
Lemma 4.10: In the lemma above, if φ i are i-objective and of maximal j-depth k for j = i, then there is a ψ of j-depth 2k + 2.
Lemma 4.11: [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001 ] If φ and ψ are i-objective basic formulas, and if
Lemma 4.12: [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001 ] Every formula α ∈ ON L n is provably equivalent to one in the normal form (written below for n = {a, b}):
where σ is a propositional formula, and ϕ im and ψ in are i-objective. If α ∈ ON L − n , ϕ im and ψ in are basic.
Theorem 4.13: For all formulas
Proof: It is sufficient to prove that every AX n -consistent formula ξ is satisfiable wrt. some (k, j)-model. If ξ is basic, then by Lemma 4.6, the statement holds. If ξ is not basic, then wlog, it can be considered in the normal form:
where σ is a propositional formula, and ϕ im and ψ in are i-objective and basic. Since σ is propositional and consistent, there is clearly a world w * such that w * |= σ. We construct a k ′ -structure such that it satisfies all the a-subjective formulas in the normal form above. Following that, a j ′ -structure for all the b-subjective formulas is constructed identically. The resulting (k ′ , j ′ )-model (with w * ) satisfies ξ.
Let A be all K45 n -consistent formulas of the form ϕ a0 ∧ ψ a0 ∧ ¬ϕ aj (for j ≥ 1) or the form ϕ a0 ∧ ψ a0 ∧ ¬ψ aj . Let γ be independent of all formulas in A, as in Lemma 4.9 and 4.10. Note that, while we take ξ itself to be of maximal a, b-depth of k, j, the depth of ϕ a0 , . . . being a-objective are of maximal b-depth k − 1, and hence γ is of b-depth 2k (Lemma 4.10). Given a consistent set of formulas, the standard Lindenbaum construction can be used to construct a maximally consistent set of formulas, all of a maximal b-depth k − 1. That is, a formula is considered in the construction only if it has a maximal b-depth k − 1. Now, let S a be a set of all maximally consistent sets of formulas, constructed by only considering formulas of maximal b-depth k − 1, and containing ϕ a0 ∧ (¬ψ a0 ∨ (ψ a0 ∧ γ)). Since each of these consistent sets are basic and a-objective, they are satisfiable by Lemma 4.6. Thus the sets S ′ ∈ S a are satisfiable wrt. 2k-structures w, e 2k b . Let k ′ = 2k + 1. By constructing a k ′ -structure for Alice, say e k ′ a , from each w, e 2k b for every S ′ ∈ S a , we have that Obj a (e k ′ a ) = S a . We shall show that all the a-subjective formulas in the normal form are satisfied wrt. e k ′ a , {}, w * . Since for all S ′ ∈ S a , we have ϕ a0 ∈ S ′ we get that e k ′ a , {}, w * |= L a ϕ a0 . Now, since L a ϕ a0 ∧ ¬L a ϕ aj is consistent, it must be that ϕ a0 ∧ ¬ϕ aj is consistent. For suppose not, then ¬ϕ a0 ∨ ϕ aj is provable and thus, we have ϕ a0 ⊃ ϕ aj . We then prove L a ϕ a0 ⊃ L a ϕ aj , and since we have L a ϕ a0 we prove L a ϕ aj , clearly inconsistent with L a ϕ a0 ∧ ¬L a ϕ aj . Now that ϕ a0 ∧ ¬ϕ aj is consistent, we either have that ϕ a0 ∧ ¬ϕ aj ∧ ψ a0 or ϕ a0 ∧ ¬ϕ aj ∧ ¬ψ a0 is consistent. With the former, we also have that ϕ a0 ∧ ¬ϕ aj ∧ ψ a0 ∧ γ is consistent. There are maximally consistent sets that contain one of them, both of which contain ¬ϕ aj . This means that, e k ′ a , {}, w * |= ¬L a ϕ aj . Now, consider some k ′ -structure w • , e •2k b ∈ e k ′ a . One of the following a-objective formulas must hold wrt. this k ′ -structure: (a) ϕ a0 ∧ ψ a0 , (b) ϕ a0 ∧ ¬ψ a0 , (c) ¬ϕ a0 ∧ ψ a0 or (d) ¬ϕ a0 ∧ ¬ψ a0 . It can not be (d), since L a ϕ a0 ∧ N a ψ a0 is consistent, and this implies that ϕ a0 ∨ ψ a0 is valid (by Lemma 4.11). It certainly cannot be (b), for it would be in some S ′ ∈ S a . This leaves us with options (c) and (a), both of which have ¬ψ a0 . Since the k ′ -structure was arbitrary, we must have for all w, e 2k
Finally, since N a ψ a0 ∧ ¬N a ψ aj is consistent, it must be that ψ a0 ∧ ¬ψ aj is consistent. Further, either ψ a0 ∧ ¬ψ aj ∧ ϕ a0 or ψ a0 ∧ ¬ψ aj ∧ ¬ϕ a0 is consistent. If the former, then ψ a0 ∧ ¬ψ aj ∧ ϕ a0 ∧ ¬γ is also consistent. Let β be that which is consistent. Note that ¬β ∧ (ϕ a0 ∧ (¬ψ a0 ∨ (ψ a0 ∧ γ))) is consistent, and hence part of all S ′ ∈ S a . This means that e k ′ a , {}, w * |= L a (¬β). But since β itself is consistent, there is a k ′ -structure such that {}, e • (b,2k) , w • |= β. And this k ′ -structure can not be in e k ′ a . This means that e k ′ a , {}, w * |= ¬N a ψ aj . Thus, all the a-subjective formulas in the normal form above are satisfiable wrt. e k ′ a . Now, observe that, although L a ⊥ ⊃ ¬N a ¬O b ¬O a p (ζ) from Theorem 3.4 is valid, yet it is not derivable from AX n . In fact, the soundness result is easily extended to the full language ON L n . Then, the proof theory cannot be complete for the full language since there is ζ ∈ ON L n such that ⊢ ζ and |= ζ. Similarly, the validity of non-provable formulas ¬O a ¬O b p and ζ wrt. the canonical model and the i-set approach respectively, show that although AX n is also sound for the full language in these approaches, it cannot be compelete. Mainly, axiom A5 n has to somehow go beyond basic formulas. As Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001] ) discuss, the problem is one of circularity. We would like the axiom to hold for any α such that it is a consistent i-objective formula, but to deal with consistency we have to clarify what the axiom system looks like. The approach taken by Halpern and Lakemeyer is to introduce validity (and its dual satisfiability) directly into the language. Formulas in the new language, ON L + n , are shown to be provably equivalent to ON L n . Some new axioms involving validity and satisfiability are added to the axiom system, and the resultant proof theory AX + n is shown to be sound and complete for formulas in ON L + n , wrt. an extended canonical model. (An extended canonical model follows the spirit of the canonical model construction but by considering maximally AX + n -consistent sets, and treat L i and N i as two independent modal operators.) So, one approach is to show that for formulas in the extended language the set of valid formulas overlap in the extended canonical model and k-structures. But then, as we argued, axiomatizing validity is not natural. Also, the proof theory is difficult to use. And in the end, we would still understand the axioms to characterize a semantics bridged on proof-theoretic elements.
Again, what is desired is a generalization of Levesque's axiom A5, and nothing more. To this end, we propose a new axiom system, that is subtly related to the structure of formulas as are parameters k and j. The axiom system has an additional t-axioms, and is to correspond to a sequence of languages ON L t n . 14 Definition 4.14: 
n , is i-objective, and consistent wrt. A1 n − A4 n , A5 1 n − A5 t n .
14 The idea was also suggested by a reviewer in [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] for an axiomatic characterization of the extended canonical model, although its completeness was left open.
formulas. Let A be all AX t n -consistent formulas of the form ϕ a0 ∧ψ a0 ∧¬ϕ aj or ϕ a0 ∧ψ a0 ∧¬ψ aj (they are of maximal b-depth k). Let γ be independent of all formulas in A. Let S a be the set of all (AX t n -) maximally consistent sets of formulas, constructed from formulas of maximal b-depth k, and containing ϕ a0 ∧ (¬ψ a0 ∨ (ψ a0 ∧ γ)), and hence by induction hypothesis they are satisfiable in some model. Note that all formulas in S a are in ON L t n . The b-depth is maximally 2k + 2. Letting k ′′ = 2k + 2, we have that for all S ′ ∈ S a , there is a w, e k ′′ b such that {}, e k ′′ b , w |= S ′ . Let k ′ = k ′′ + 1. Letting e k ′ a be all such k ′ -structures w, e k ′′ b for each S ′ ∈ S a makes Obj + a (e k ′ a ) = S a (in contrast, for Thereom 4.13 we dealt with Obj a ). We claim that this k ′ -structure for Alice, a j ′ -structure for Bob constructed similarly, and a world where σ holds (there is such a world since σ is propositional and consistent) is a model where α is satisfied. The proof proceeds as in Theorem 4.13. We show the case of ¬L a ϕ aj .
Since L a ϕ a0 ∧¬L a ϕ aj is consistent wrt. AX t+1 n , it must be that ϕ a0 ∧¬ϕ aj is consistent wrt. AX t+1 n . Further, since ϕ a0 , ϕ aj ∈ ON L t n , they must consistent be wrt. AX t n (for if not, they cannot by definition be consistent wrt. AX t+1 n ). This means that either ϕ a0 ∧ ¬ϕ aj ∧ ψ a0 or ϕ a0 ∧ ¬ϕ aj ∧ ¬ψ a0 is consistent. If the former is, then so is ϕ a0 ∧ ¬ϕ aj ∧ ψ a0 ∧ γ. Since S a consist of all AX t n -consistent formulas containing ϕ a0 ∧ (¬ψ a0 ∧ (ψ a0 ∧ γ)), there is clearly a S ′ ∈ S a such that ¬ϕ aj ∈ S ′ . Consequently, it can not be that
Thus, we have a sound and complete axiomatization for the propositional fragment of ON L n . In comparison to Lakemeyer ([1993] ), the axiomatization goes beyond a language that restricts the nesting of N i . In contrast to Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001] ), the axiomatization does not necessitate the use of semantic notions in the proof theory. A third axiomatization by [Waaler 2004; Waaler & Solhaug 2005] proposes an interesting alternative to deal with the circularity in a generalized A5. The idea is to first define consistency by formulating a fragment of the axiom system in the sequent calculus. Quite analogous to having t-axioms, they allow us to apply A5 n on i-objective formulas of a lower depth, thus avoiding circularity without the need to appeal to satisfiability as in [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] . Waaler and Solhaug ([2005] ) also define a semantics for multi-agent only-knowing which does not appeal to canonical models. Instead, they define a class of Kripke structures which need to satisfy certain constraints. Unfortunately, these constraints are quite involved and, as the authors admit, the nature of these models "is complex and hard to penetrate."
To get a feel of the axiomatization, let us consider a well studied example from [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001 ] to see where we differ. Suppose Alice assumes the following default: unless I know that Bob knows my secret then he does not know it. If the default is all that she knows, then she nonmonotonically comes to believe that Bob does not know her secret. Let γ be a proposition that denotes Alice's secret, and we want to show that
and we freely reason with propositional logic (PL) or K45 n .
We use A5 1 n , and it is applicable because ¬L b γ is a-objective and K45 n -consistent. Now, suppose Alice is cautious. She changes her default to assume that if she does not believe Bob to only-know some set of facts θ ∈ Φ, then θ is not all that he knows. We would like to show
n is a-objective and AX 1 n -consistent. The latter proof requires reasoning with the satisfiability modal operator in Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001] ), and is not provable with the axioms of Lakemeyer ([1993] ).
Autoepistemic Logic
Having examined the properties of multi-agent only-knowing, in terms of a semantics for both the firstorder and propositional case, and an axiomatization for the propositional case, in the current section we discuss how the semantics also captures autoepistemic logic (AEL). AEL, as originally developed by Moore ([1985] ), intends to allow agents to draw conclusions, by making observations of their own epistemic states. For instance, Alice concludes that she has no brother because if she did have one then she would have known about it, and she does not know about it [Moore 1985 ]. The characterization of such beliefs are defined using fixpoints called stable expansions. In the single agent case, Levesque ([1990] ) showed that the beliefs of an agent who only-knows α is precisely the stable expansion of α. Of course, the leverage with the former is that it is specified using regular entailments. In Lakemeyer ([1993] ), and Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001] ), a many agent generalization of AEL is considered in the sense of a stable expansion for every agent, and relating this to what the agent only-knows. But their generalizations are only for the propositional fragment, while Levesque's definitions involved firstorder entailments. In contrast, we obtain the corresponding quantificational multi-agent generalization of AEL. We state the main theorems below. The proofs are omitted since they follow very closely from the ideas for the single agent case [Levesque & Lakemeyer 2001 ].
Definition 5.1: Let A be a set of formulas, and Γ is the i-stable expansion of A iff it the set of first-order implications of A ∪ {L i β | β ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬L i β | β ∈ Γ}.
Definition 5.2: [Maximal structure] If e k a is a k-structure, let e + a be a k-structure with the addition of all w ′ , e 
Theorem 5.3 essentially says that the complete set of basic beliefs at a maximal epistemic state where α is all that i knows, precisely coincides with the i-stable expansion of α.
Axiomatizing Validity
Extending the work in [Lakemeyer 1993] and [Halpern 1993] , which was only restricted to formulas in ON L − n , Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001] ) proposed a multi-agent only-knowing logic that handles the nesting of N i operators. But as discussed, there are two undesirable features. The first is a semantics based on canonical models, and the second is a proof theory that axiomatizes validity. Although such a construction is far from natural, we show in this section that they do indeed capture the desired properties of only-knowing. This also instructs us that our axiomatization avoids such problems in a reasonable manner.
Recall that the language of [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001 ] is ON L + n , which is ON L n and a modal operator for validity, Val. A modal operator Sat, for satisfiability, is used freely such that Val(α) is syntactically equivalent to ¬Sat(¬α). To enable comparisons, we present a variant of our logic, that has all its main features, but has additional notions to handle the extended language. We then show that this logic and [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001 ] agree on the set of valid sentences from ON L + n (and also ON L n ).
The main feature of [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001 ] is the proof theory AX ′ n , and a semantics that is sound and complete for AX [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] .
Proof: AX
′ n is sound and complete for [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] , and AX + n t is sound and complete for |=.
Since it can be shown that every α ∈ ON L + n is provably equivalent to some α ′ ∈ ON L n [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] , we also obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 6.5: For all α ∈ ON L t n , |= α iff α is valid in [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] .
Conclusions
This paper has the following new results. We have a first-order modal logic for multi-agent onlyknowing that we show, for the first time, generalizes Levesque's semantics. Unlike all attempts so far, we neither make use of proof-theoretic notions of maximal consistency nor Kripke structures [Waaler & Solhaug 2005] . The benefit is that the semantic proofs are straightforward, and we understand possible worlds precisely as Levesque meant. We then analyzed a propositional subset, and showed first that the axiom system from Lakemeyer ([1993] ) is sound and complete for a restricted language. We used this result to devise a new proof theory that does not require us axiomatize any semantic notions [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] . Our axiomatization was shown to be sound and complete for the semantics, and its use is straightforward on formulas involving the nesting of at most operators. In the process, we revisited the features of only-knowing and compared the semantical framework to other approaches. Its behavior seems to coincide with our intuitions, and it also captures a multi-agent generalization of Moore's AEL. Finally, although the axiomatization of Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001] ) is not natural, we showed that they essentially capture the desired properties of multi-agent only-knowing, but at much expense.
